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Abstract—In cloud storage services, a wide range of sensitive
information may be leaked to the host server via the exposure of
access pattern albeit data is encrypted. Many security-provable
schemes have been proposed to preserve the access pattern
privacy; however, they may be vulnerable to attacks towards data
integrity or availability from malicious users. This is due to the
fact that, preserving access pattern privacy requires data to be
frequently re-encrypted and re-positioned at the storage server,
which can easily conceal the traces that are needed for account-
ability support to detect misbehaviors and identify attackers. To
address this issue, this paper proposes a scheme that integrates
accountability support into hash-based ORAMs. Security analysis
shows that the proposed scheme can detect misconduct committed
by malicious users and identify the attackers, while preserving
the access pattern privacy. Overhead analysis shows that the
proposed accountability support incurs only slightly increased
storage, communication, and computational overheads.
I. INTRODUCTION
Along with the increasing popularity of cloud-based data
sharing, security and privacy concerns also arise. Although
encrypting data content has been commonly used for data
protection, it alone cannot eliminate the concerns completely.
This is because users’ data access pattern is not preserved
and researchers have found that a wide range of private
information could be conveniently revealed by observing the
access pattern [1]. To address this issue, more and more
efficient designs [2]–[17] have been developed to implement
oblivious RAM (ORAM) [18], which was originally proposed
for software protection but also is a provable solution to data
access pattern preservation.
Though initially designed for single-user scenarios, ORAM
has also been applied to multi-user scenarios [14], [19].
However, these systems all assume that the outsourced data is
accessible to the data owner and trusted users only; hence, they
do not provide any protection against attacks from malicious
users on data integrity or availability. Unfortunately, users may
not always behave faithfully in practice. Thus, it is highly
desirable to introduce accountability support into ORAM to
provide privacy-preserving accountable cloud storage services.
For example, a company may export its financial records to a
cloud storage; while it may want to share the financial data
with its stake holders, it is critical to protect the integrity of
the data and hold a malicious user accountable if data is altered
without authorization.
Many schemes [20], [21] have been proposed to provide
accountability support in multi-user storage systems. However,
these schemes cannot be readily applied to ORAM because
of the following conflicting design goals: preserving access
pattern privacy in ORAM requires data blocks to be frequently
re-encrypted and re-positioned at the storage server, which can
easily conceal the traces that are needed for accountability
support to detect misbehaviors and identify attackers. In this
paper, we propose a unique accountability solution for hash-
based ORAMs such as the one proposed in [18]. It is capable
of detecting misconduct by malicious users and identifying
the attackers, while not interfering with the access pattern
preservation mechanism inherent from the underlying ORAM.
This goal is achieved via a creative application and integration
of two well-known security techniques: Merkle hash tree [22]
and group signature [23], as well as a delicate design of the
data block format. With our scheme, selected traces of accesses
are properly recorded for the purpose of attack detection
but without revealing the private information of innocent
users that shall be kept confidential to protect their access
pattern privacy. We have conducted both security analysis and
overhead evaluation for the proposed scheme. Results show
that our scheme has achieved the design goals of providing
accountability support to ORAM and preservation of data
access pattern privacy, at the cost of slightly increased storage,
communication, and computational overheads.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the related work. The system model is described in
Section III and the proposed design is elaborated in Section IV.
Sections V and VI report the security and overhead analysis.
Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Oblivious RAM (ORAM), first proposed by Goldreich and
Ostrovsky [18], is a well-known technique to hide a user’s
access pattern from an outsourced data storage server. In
recent years, various schemes [2]–[17] have been proposed to
improve the performance of ORAM from both theoretical and
practical aspects in terms of communication overhead, storage
overhead, and query latency.
While ORAM has become more practical in terms of
performance, there are security issues that need to be addressed
before ORAM can be deployed in real systems. There are only
a few works that address these practical security concerns
under the framework of ORAM. For example, in [24], an
integrity verification scheme for path ORAM [13] was pro-
posed to ensure data integrity against a malicious server with
a Merkle hash tree solution. In another example, the problem
of ORAM delegation was studied in [25]. It proposes a scheme
with which the data owner can delegate controlled access
to third parties for the outsourced dataset, while preserving
the access pattern privacy. However, this scheme can only be
applied to the square-root ORAM [18], which is inefficient
in terms of communication overhead. As a third example, a
write-once-read-many ORAM (WORM-ORAM) was proposed
in [26], which enables the data owner to offer a read-only data
service to third parties. It proposes a zero-knowledge proof
based scheme to verify the integrity of the encrypted data
in a write-once-read-many setting. But, it imposes expensive
communication and computational overheads over the regular
ORAM, which may limit its practical applications.
Different from these existing works, we study user account-
ability in this paper, which is an important security feature
required by most data sharing services. We propose a low-
overhead scheme to provide user accountability support to
hash-based ORAM schemes [4]–[6], [9], [10], [18] without
compromising the access pattern privacy provided by the
underlying ORAM.
Private information retrieval (PIR) [27], [28] is another
popular technique to preserve user’s access pattern. However,
PIR protocols work on read-only data. In this paper, we
consider a system where users can both read and write data.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS
In this paper, we study a system where the owner of a
dataset outsources data to a remote storage server and shares
data with multiple users. Based on the access control require-
ment of the application, the owner may authorize different
users with different access privileges. For each data item, we
consider three types of access privileges: no access, read-only
access, and write access. Moreover, in order to prevent leakage
of access pattern privacy, the owner is assumed to follow a
hash-based Oblivious RAM (ORAM) design to deploy the data
on the storage server.
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Fig. 1. System architecture and threat model.
There are many possible security or privacy attacks against
such multi-user cloud storage systems. As the starting point
toward building a fully accountable and privacy-preserving
cloud storage system, we assume the following threat model
in this paper, as illustrated in Fig. III.
 Data owner is trusted.
 Storage server is honest but curious in learning about
data owner and users’ data access patterns.
 A user may attempt to attack the data integrity or avail-
ability via un-authorized modification, replacement, or
misplacement. However, we assume the user executes
the underlying ORAM protocol honestly to protect its
own access pattern privacy.
 Multiple malicious users may collude. However, more
sophisticated collusive attacks launched by the storage
server and malicious users together are not considered
in this work.
 We do not consider protecting a user’s access pattern
privacy against a malicious user. Generally, this can be
addressed by protecting the communication between
the user and the server with TLS [29].
To summarize, the design goals of the proposed scheme
are: (i) preserving data owner and users’ access patterns to the
dataset, including both the overall access pattern and a single
user’s or a group of users’ access pattern; and (ii) detecting
data integrity attacks launched by malicious users and, upon
detection, enabling data owner to identify the attackers.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
Our scheme is designed to integrate with most hash-
based ORAM schemes [4]–[6], [9], [10], [18]. Please refer to
Appendix 1 for a brief explanation of the ORAM operations. In
this paper, we explain how our scheme works with the seminal
hash-based ORAM scheme proposed by O. Goldreich and R.
Ostrovsky [18], which provides a framework for all other hash-
based ORAMs. Our scheme is based on integration of two
well-known techniques: (i) Merkle hash tree [22] which allows
efficient verification of the integrity of a large set of data, and
(ii) group signature [23] which allows each member of a group
to anonymously sign a message on behalf of the group. Please
also refer to Appendix 1 for detailed explanations of these
techniques. In the following, we first present the intuitions of
the proposed scheme, and then explain the details of the design.
A. Scheme Overview: The Intuitions
Built on top of a hash-based ORAM such as [18], our
proposed scheme has the ultimate goal of user accountability
and data access pattern preservation, which is attained through
accomplishing each of the following more specific subgoals:
(G1) If the content of a data block is modified by an un-
authorized user, such a modification attack shall be
detected and the attacker shall be identified.
(G2) During a query or shuffling process, the set of data blocks
that a user uploads to the server shall be the same as
the set downloaded earlier. If a user fails to do so by
replacing some of the data blocks with others, such a
replacement attack shall be detected and the user shall
be identified.
(G3) When being uploaded, data blocks shall be placed prop-
erly to the buckets decided by the underlying ORAM;
that is, the position of each data block shall be deter-
mined by a designated hash function. If a user fails to
do so, such a misplacement attack shall be detected and
the user shall be identified.
Accomplishment of Subgoal (G1) In our scheme, subgoal
(G1) is accomplished via group signatures. Initially, when
exporting a data block to the server, the data owner generates
two group signatures: s – a group signature for the entire data
block (on behalf of all the users in the system), and g – a
group signature for the content and ID of the data block only
(on behalf of the users who have the write privilege to the
data block). When a user accesses a data block, it verifies
both signatures. If s is valid but g is invalid, it is detected
that the user who last accessed the data block has modified
the data block without proper authorization, and the identity
of the attacking user can be traced out by the data owner
based on the group signature s. If both signatures are valid,
the user proceeds to access the data and generates a new group
signature s before uploading the data block back to the server.
Note that, if the user has the write privilege and has modified
the data content, it also needs to generate a new group signature
g for the updated data content. At the server side, after it
receives a data block from the user, it simply checks the group
signature s. If it is invalid, the uploading user is detected to
have committed a misconduct.
Accomplishment of Subgoal (G2) During a query or
shuffling process, data blocks are re-encrypted and re-arranged.
Therefore, it is challenging to ensure that the user always
uploads the same set of data blocks that it downloaded from
the server. In our scheme, this is accomplished via group signa-
tures and Merkle hash tree. Specifically, after a user requests
and downloads a set of data blocks, the server constructs a
Merkle hash tree using the hash values of the IDs of the
requested blocks as leaf nodes, and calculates the root hash
of the tree. Then, the server informs the user of the root hash
as well as the co-path information in the Merkle hash tree for
each data block. After access to the data, the user updates the
following information in each data block before uploading it
back to the server: c – hash of the block ID with a new random
nonce, e – root hash of the Merkle hash tree (informed by
the server), and e0 – an encryption of the co-path information
(also informed by the server) with a new random nonce. Recall
that the data content and block ID are protected by the group
signature g.
This way, if a user fails to upload the same set of data
blocks back to the server (by replacing some of the data blocks
with others), such a replacement attack can be detected by
the server or the user who next accesses the data block. For
example, if a user replaces the content of a data block with
that of another data block, together with block ID, or co-path
information, or root hash, or a combination (but not all) of
them, this can be detected by the user who next accesses the
data block, since the root hash carried in the data block would
be different from the one calculated using the block ID and
co-path information. However, if the user replaces the entire
data block, this can be detected by the server, since either the
root hash of the data block is different from all other uploaded
blocks, or the encrypted co-path information of the data block
is identical to another uploaded block. Also note that the server
cannot identify a data block using the hash of the block ID
or the co-path information, because both hash and encryption
operations use a new random nonce.
Accomplishment of Subgoal (G3) With the above solutions
to subgoals (G1) and (G2) in place, the solution to subgoal
(G3) becomes straightforward as follows. To ensure that a
data block is placed properly according to the underlying
ORAM, our scheme requires the user to include the position
information (i.e., layer and bucket) as part of the block before
generating the group signature s. Next time when another user
accesses the block, it checks (i) whether the block was placed
at the position specified in the data block, and (ii) whether
the position is consistent with the output of the hash function
designated by the underlying ORAM.
Next, we elaborate the details of the our scheme which
integrates the above solutions to subgoals (G1)-(G3).
B. System Initialization
System initialization is conducted by the owner of the
dataset. It consists of four operations: selection of system
parameters, user authorization, preparation of data blocks,
and uploading of data blocks to the storage server. In the
following, we describe these operations in detail. Particularly,
when describing how to prepare and upload data blocks, the
data format and storage structure will also be introduced.
1) Selection of System Parameters: As the first step of
system initialization, the data owner classifies all data blocks
into read groups and write groups according to the access
policy. Specifically,
 a read group (denoted by Rj) is defined as the jth set
of data blocks that have the same read access policy,
i.e., they can be read by the same set of users;
 a write group (denoted by Wj) is defined as the jth set
of data blocks that have the same write access policy,
i.e., they can be written by the same set of users.
Each data block in the system belongs to exactly one read
group and one write group. Let n be the total number of data
blocks exported to the storage server. Let mR and mW denote
the number of read groups and write groups, respectively. We
have mR 6 n and mW 6 n, where the equality holds when
every data block has a different read/write access policy. In
practice, we usually have mR  n and mW  n. Table I
lists the system parameters.
TABLE I. SYSTEM PARAMETERS SELECTED BY THE DATA OWNER.
Notation Description
Rj (Wj ) the jth read (write) group
mR(mW ) number of read (write) groups
U the set of all data users
URj the set of users that can read blocks in Rj
UWj the set of users that can write blocks in Wj
k a system symmetric key for all users
kRj (j  1) a symmetric key that is used to encrypt the
plain-text content of all blocks in Rj
K+Wj
(j  1) the group public key for write block group Wj
K u;Wj (j  1) a group private key assigned to user u who can
write all data blocks in Wj
Gj -Sigu() group signature signed using K u;Wj
K+0 the group public key for all data blocks
K u;0 a group private key assigned to user u 2 U
G0-Sigu() group signature signed using K u;0
hl(x; y) hash function that maps x and y 2 f1;    ; ng to
an integer in f1;    ; 2lg (l = 1;    ; logn)
H() a general one-way hash function
E() a block cipher algorithm with key 
Let U denote the set of all users in the system. For each
Rj (j  1), the data owner selects a symmetric key kRj to
encrypt the plain-text content of all data blocks in Rj . For
each Wj (j  1), the owner also selects one group public
key (K+Wj ) and a set of group private keys (fK u;Wjgu2U ),
where K u;Wj denotes the private key assigned to user u. We
use Gj-Sigu() to denote the group signature generated with
K u;Wj . In addition, the data owner also selects the following
system parameters:
 k: a system symmetric key for general encryption
purposes. It is known to all users in U .
 K+0 , fK u;0gu2U : one group public key (K+0 ) and a
set of group private keys (fK u;0gu2U ), where K u;0
denotes the private key assigned to user u. We use
G0-Sigu() to denote the group signature generated
with K u;0.
 hl(x; y) for l = 1;    ; logn: a set of hash functions,
where each hl(x; y) hashes a pair of positive integers
x and y 2 f1;    ; ng to an integer in f1;    ; 2lg.
They are known to all users in U .
 H(x): a hash function that randomly maps one or a
sequence of integers to an L-bit integer, where L is a
security parameter.
 E(; ): a symmetric block cipher algorithm work-
ing in CBC mode, where  is the encryption key,
 is the initialization vector, and  is the plain-text
to be encrypted. We also use E(; ; ) to denote
the encryption of the concatenation of  and  with
the initialization vector  (i.e., the first parameter is
always the initialization vector).
2) User Authorization: Among the parameters, K+0 and
hash function H(x) are available to the public. For each user
u 2 U , the owner provides the symmetric key k, a distinct
group private key K u;0, and the set of group public keys
K+Wj . Let URj and UWj denote the set of users who can read
blocks in Rj and the set of users who can write blocks in Wj ,
respectively. If a user u is authorized to read data blocks in
Rj , i.e., u 2 URj , the owner provides the symmetric key kRj
to the user; if a user u is authorized to write data blocks in
Wj , i.e., u 2 UWj , the owner provides a group private key
K u;Wj to the user.
Table II summarizes how the keys are distributed to the
server and users. Basically, a user needs to store (i) k, K+0 ,
and one group private key K u;0 (O(1) overhead), (ii) a number
of kRj for the read groups that it is allowed to read (O(mR)
overhead), (iii) a number of group private keys K u;Wj for the
write groups that it is allowed to write (O(mW ) overhead),
(iv) mW group public keys K+Wj (O(mW ) overhead). If a
misbehaving user is identified, the user could be revoked from
the system with existing schemes such as [30], [31].
TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF KEYS TO THE SERVER AND USERS.
k K+0 K
 
u;0 kRj K
+
Wj
K u;Wj
server
p
u 2 U p p p p
u 2 URj
p p p p p
u 2 UWj
p p p p p
3) Preparation of Data Blocks: We use i to denote the
ID of a data block and use Di;ti to denote the data block
associated with ID i and time stamp ti. To simplify the
presentation, when describing a data block, we use ki to denote
the encryption key and use K+i and K
 
u;i to denote the group
public key and private keys that are used by data block Di;ti .
For example, if Di;ti 2 Rj0 and Di;ti 2 Wj00 , we denote
ki = kRj0 , K
+
i = K
+
Wj00
, and K u;i = K
 
u;Wj00
.
The plain-text content carried in Di;ti is denoted as wi;vi ,
where vi denotes the version number of the data content and
is incremented when the content is updated. To enforce the
access control policy, wi;vi is encrypted together with its ID i
by its corresponding encryption key ki. We use di;vi to denote
the encrypted data content in Di;ti , i.e.,
di;vi = Eki(ri;vi ; i; wi;vi): (1)
where ri;vi is a random initialization vector chosen upon
each encryption of wi;vi . Overall, a data block Di;ti has the
following format:
Di;ti = hd0i;ti ; ci;ti ; ei;ti 1; e0i;ti 1; li;ti ; bi;ti ; si;tii; (2)
where the fields are explained below. A high-level explanation
of the purpose of each data field is shown in Fig. 2, while
detailed explanations about how these data fields are used will
be presented in Section IV-C and Section V.
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Fig. 2. A high-level explanation of the purpose of each data field in the data
block. (V1)-(V5) along the dashed lines indicate the verification steps that are
performed by a user, which will be explained later in Section IV-C.
As shown in Fig. 2, d0i;ti is a one-time encryption of
the concatenation of the following items: (i) a random nonce
i;ti that is randomly selected upon each encryption, (ii) the
random nonce ri;vi that is used in the encryption of di;vi , (iii)
the random nonce ri;vi 1 that was used in the encryption of
di;vi 1, i.e., the previous version of the data content, (iv) the
block ID i, (v) the encrypted data content di;vi , and (vi) a
group signature gi;vi generated by the owner or a user who
has the privilege to write this block, i.e.,
gi;vi = Gi-Sigu(i; di;vi ; ri;vi ; ri;vi 1): (3)
Thus, d0i;ti has the following format:
d0i;ti = Ek(i;ti ; i;ti ; ri;vi ; ri;vi 1; i; di;vi ; gi;vi); (4)
where i;ti is a random initialization vector that is different
from ri;vi in Eq. (1) and Eq. (3). i;ti can be updated by
any user who possesses k and its main purpose is to change
the appearance of the encrypted data after each access. In
comparison, ri;vi can only be updated by a user who is
authorized to write the data block and its main purpose is to
prevent replacement attacks launched by malicious users. We
include another random nonce i;ti because it will be used as
the initialization vector for another data field e0i;ti 1, which
will be explained in the following. The purpose of the group
signature gi;vi is to protect the integrity of d
0
i;ti
, so that only
a user who is authorized to write the data block (and hence
owns the group private key K u;i) can update ri;vi , ri;vi 1, and
di;vi legitimately. Meanwhile, it also enables the data owner to
track the identity of the user who made the last modification.
ci;ti is a one-time hash of the block ID i, together with
random nonces i;ti and ri;vi :
ci;ti = H(i;ti ; i; ri;vi): (5)
During each query or reshuffling process, ci;ti is used by the
server to build a Merkle hash tree based on the data blocks
requested.
ei;ti 1 is the root hash of the Merkle hash tree that was
constructed by the server when Di;ti was last accessed (for
simplicity, we use ti   1 to denote the time stamp when
Di;ti was last accessed). In other words, the leaf nodes of
the Merkle hash tree are the ID hashes of all the blocks
downloaded together with Di;ti 1. The purpose of ei;ti 1
(together with e0i;ti 1 which is explained below) is to let the
user and the server collaboratively verify that, when a data
block was previously accessed, the set of data blocks uploaded
back to the server after the access was the same as the set
downloaded.
e0i;ti 1 is a one-time encryption of the hash tree information
that is needed to calculate the root hash ei;ti 1. Specifically,
e0i;ti 1 = Ek(i;ti 1; Si;ti 1); (6)
where Si;ti 1 denotes the co-path hash values for leaf hash
ci;ti 1 on the Merkle hash tree when the data block was
retrieved at time ti 1. Note that the same initialization vector
i;ti 1 is used in the encryption of e
0
i;ti 1 and d
0
i;ti 1.
li;ti and bi;ti are the layer and bucket of block Di;ti in the
storage hierarchy respectively. si;ti is a group signature of the
entire block generated by the owner or any user in the system:
si;ti = G0-Sigu(d
0
i;ti ; ci;ti ; ei;ti 1; e
0
i;ti 1; li;ti ; bi;ti): (7)
Similar to gi;vi , the purpose of si;ti is to allow the server and
users to verify the integrity of the entire data block, as well as
to enable the owner to track the identity of the user who last
accessed the data block.
Initially, the time stamp ti and the version number vi are
set to 0, both ei;ti 1 and e
0
i;ti 1 are set to empty, li;ti is set
to log n, and bi;ti is set to hlogn(0; i).
4) Uploading of Data Blocks to the Storage Server: All the
data blocks are stored to a hierarchy of layers according to the
underlying ORAM. Specifically, the hierarchy consists of logn
layers. Each layer l (1 6 l 6 log n) includes 2l buckets
and each bucket contains log n blocks. Hence, the server stores
(2n  2) log n data blocks in total, which includes n real data
blocks that contain meaningful data exported by the owner. The
other (2n 2) log n n data blocks in the hierarchy are called
dummy data blocks. They simply contain random stuffing data
and no user (except the owner) is authorized to write a dummy
block. To create a dummy data block, the owner randomly
generates a unique block ID and some data content, and then
creates the data block in the same format as the real data
block. Each dummy data block Dj;tj is initialized with tj set
to 0, ej;tj 1 and e
0
j;tj 1 set to empty, and lj;tj and bj;tj set
to some layer and bucket so that dummy data blocks fill up
all the storage locations not occupied by real data blocks. In
addition, the server maintains a counter Cq (with an initial
value of 0) which keeps track of the number of queries that
have been processed.
C. Query Process
The query process is executed when a user needs to retrieve
a target data block (denote its ID as T ). We show the flowchart
of the proposed query process in Fig. 3(b), together with
the flowchart of the query process in the original ORAM
in Fig. 3(a). Specifically, to retrieve the target block, a user
performs the following operations.
(Q1) Both buckets at the top layer of the storage hierarchy
are retrieved from the server. If the target data block is
found in the buckets, the flag found is set to true;
else, it is set to false.
(Q2) Counter Cq is retrieved from the server and is incre-
mented by 1,
(Q3) For each layer i from 2 to log n, the following is
performed:
 If found = true, a bucket is selected uniformly
at random from the layer and all the data blocks
in the bucket are retrieved.
 If found = false, all data blocks in bucket
hi(bCq=2ic; T ) are retrieved. If target block is
found among the retrieved blocks, found is set
to true.
(Q4) After all the requested data blocks have been retrieved,
the server constructs a Merkle hash tree based on the data
ID hashes (i.e., ci;ti) of the retrieved blocks, calculates
the root hash (i.e., ei;ti) of the tree, and saves it for future
verification purposes. Then, the server notifies the user
of the root hash and the co-path hash values (i.e., Si;ti)
for each retrieved data block Di;ti .
(Q5) The user verifies all the retrieved data blocks, accesses
the content of the target data block, re-formats all the
retrieved data blocks, and then uploads them back to the
server. More specifically, this step involves the operations
of verification, updating, and uploading, as explained
below.
1) Verification: Each retrieved data block Di;ti is verified
as follows.
(V1) Verification of group signature si;ti : si;ti is verified with
the public key K+0 .
(V2) Verification of group signature gi;vi: gi;vi is verified
with the group public key K+i . If it is invalid, a user
misconduct has been detected, as the user who last
accessed the block must have altered the data content
without proper authorization.
(V3) Verification of ID hash ci;ti : The correctness of
ci;ti is verified by checking whether it is equal to
H(i;ti ; i; ri;vi). Note that, i;ti , i, and ri;vi are parts
of d0i;ti and hence protected by the group signature gi;vi .
If ci;ti is incorrect, a user misconduct has been detected.
User Server
Upload target data block to top layer
Decrypt & Access
Update: Re-encrypt data block
1=l
All data blocks in both buckets
2,2 φ=l
All data blocks in bucket 2φ
…
 
n
nl log,log φ=
All data blocks in bucket nlogφ
User Server
Upload all retrieved data blocks 
Merkle hash tree information 
1=l
All data blocks in both buckets
2,2 φ=l
All data blocks in bucket 2φ
…
 
n
nl log,log φ=
All data blocks in bucket nlogφ
Merkle hash tree computation
Verify: (1) group signature; (2) block hash value; 
(3) Merkle hash tree; (4) data placement
Decrypt & Access
Update: (1) re-encrypt data block; (2) update 
block hash value; (3) update group signature
Verify: (1) group signature; 
(2) Merkle hash tree
(a) original ORAM (b) the proposed scheme
Fig. 3. Flowcharts of the query process in the original ORAM and the proposed scheme. Operations added in the proposed scheme are shown in bold boxes.
Operations modified from those in the original ORAM are shown in gray boxes.
(V4) Verification of root hash ei;ti 1: Recall that ei;ti 1 is
the root hash of the Merkle hash tree constructed by
the server when the data block was last accessed. To
verify it, the user needs the following information: the
ID hash ci;ti 1 and the co-path hashes Si;ti 1 when
the data block was last accessed. As we will explain
in the “Updating” operation below, if the last access to
the data block was a write access, a new random nonce
rvi would be generated. Therefore, as the user is unsure
about the last access, it verifies ei;ti 1 against both rvi
and rvi 1. In other words, it checks whether ei;ti 1 is
the same as the root hash calculated based on using
either H(i;ti 1; i; ri;vi) or H(i;ti 1; i; ri;vi 1) as the
ID hash ci;ti 1, and the co-path hashes Si;ti 1. If both
fail, a user misconduct has been detected. Note that ri;vi
and ri;vi 1 can be obtained from d
0
i;ti
, while i;ti 1 and
Si;ti 1 can be obtained from e0i;ti 1.
(V5) Verification of data block placement: Suppose Di;ti is
retrieved from bucket b of layer l (l > 1). It is checked
whether li;ti = l and bi;ti = b. Also, if the block is
not a dummy, it is verified whether b = hl(bCq=2lc; i).
If verification fails, a misplacement attack has been
detected.
2) Updating: If all the verifications succeed, the user
accesses the target data and then updates all the retrieved data
blocks as follows.
For each data block i, a new random initialization vector
i;new and a new random nonce i;new are selected. Then, the
user sets i;ti+1 = i;new and i;ti+1 = i;new. In addition,
if a data block is the target block and the current access is
a write access, a new random nonce ri;new is selected and
ri;vi+1 = ri;new. Then, for each block, the user calculates d
0
and c with the updated data content and random nonces. e0
and e are updated based on the co-path hashes (S) and the
root hash (e) of the Merkle hash tree, which were notified by
the server during query step (Q4).
Next, according to the underlying ORAM, a dummy block
is randomly picked from the top layer of the storage hierarchy,
and the target block swaps its position with the dummy by
swapping the values of their b and l fields. For all other blocks,
b and l fields remain unchanged. Finally, a new group signature
s is generated for each block.
3) Uploading: After all the retrieved data blocks have been
updated, they are uploaded back to the server at the positions
determined by their b and l values. The order in which the
blocks are uploaded is arbitrary. In addition, if the counter Cq
is a multiple of 2l for certain l 2 f1;    ; log ng but not a
multiple of any 2l
0
where l0 > l, a shuffling process for layer
l should be conducted. The shuffling process is elaborated in
Section IV-D.
4) Server Operations: Upon receiving an uploaded data
block, the server performs the following verifications. If any
of them fails, a user misconduct has been detected and the
server refuses to accept the block.
(O1) Verify the validity of the group signature s;
(O2) Verify that the root hash e carried in the block is the same
as the root hash of the Merkle hash tree constructed by
the server during query Step (Q4);
(O3) Verify that the e0 value carried in the block is differ-
ent from all other uploaded blocks. This is to prevent
replacement attacks launched by the user.
(O4) Increase the counter Cq by one.
D. Shuffling Process
The shuffling process for layer l is to obliviously re-
position and re-format all the blocks residing at layers 1,
   , l so that: (i) after the shuffling, each bucket contains the
same number (i.e., log n) of blocks; (ii) each real data block
Di;ti is placed to bucket hl(
Cq
2i ; i) of layer l, where Cq is
the afore-mentioned counter keeping track of the number of
queries that have been processed. As in the original ORAM,
our proposed shuffling process also contains several rounds of
scanning, tagging, and oblivious sorting. However, the original
ORAM shuffling scheme must be modified in order to provide
accountability support. Due to space limitation, please refer to
Appendix 2 for details.
E. Insertion and Deletion
Occasionally, the file system may be updated by adding
new data blocks and/or removing existing data blocks. Due
to space limitation, please refer to Appendix 3 for how the
proposed scheme handles data insertion and deletion.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the security analysis of the
proposed scheme.
A. Access Pattern Privacy
We first show that the proposed scheme ensures the same
access pattern privacy offered by the underlying ORAM, which
is formally presented in Theorem 1. In order to prove Theo-
rem 1, we first present the following two lemmas (Lemma 1
and Lemma 2).
Lemma 1: Compared with the original ORAM, the pro-
posed data format does not provide extra information that helps
the server identify a data block.
Proof: To hide access pattern, ORAM requires that the
server cannot identify a data block from its appearance when
multiple data blocks are put back to the server during a query
or shuffling process. To achieve this, each data block in the
original ORAM, in its simplest format, is just ciphertext gen-
erated over the real data content by a probabilistic symmetric
encryption algorithm. In our proposed scheme, as shown in
Eq. (2), each data block contains seven data fields that are
visible to the server, including d0i;ti , ci;ti , ei;ti 1, e
0
i;ti 1, li;ti ,
bi;ti , and si;ti . We now show that, compared with the original
ORAM, none of them leaks extra information that may help
the server identify a data block.
 d0i;ti , which contains the real data content, is equiv-
alent to the encrypted data block as in the original
ORAM. It is a ciphertext output by a probabilistic
encryption function E() which is semantically secure.
Given that (i) the size of the real content in each data
block (i.e., wi;vi) is the same, and (ii) i;ti , ri;vi ,
ri;vi 1, i, and gi;vi for each block have the same size,
d0i;ti of each data block has the same length. As a
result, compared with the original ORAM, the server
does not gain extra information from d0i;ti .
 ci;ti is the hash of the concatenation of i;ti , i and
ri;vi . Because i;ti is picked randomly for each data
block downloaded during a query or shuffling process,
ci;ti appears random for each uploaded data block.
Therefore, the server does not gain extra information
from ci;ti .
 ei;ti 1 is the root hash of a Merkle hash tree that is
constructed during a query or shuffling process. In the
proposed scheme, data blocks that are put back to the
server in the same query or shuffling process will have
the same ei;ti 1. As a result, ei;ti 1 cannot help the
server identify a data block.
 e0i;ti 1 is the ciphertext of i;ti 1 and Si;ti 1 with a
semantically secure function E(). Because i;ti 1 is
randomly picked for each data block, the server does
not gain extra information from e0i;ti 1.
 li;ti and bi;ti are the location information of each data
block, which actually are observable by the server.
Therefore, inclusion of them in a data block does not
leak extra information to the server.
 si;ti is a group signature re-generated for each up-
loaded data block and is random because the content
to be signed has changed. Thus, it does not help the
server identify a data block.
Lemma 2: Compared with the original ORAM, neither the
query process nor the shuffling process in the proposed scheme
leaks additional information that helps the server identify a
data block.
Proof: As for query, in our proposed scheme, the bucket
to be retrieved on each layer during downloading is the
same as the original ORAM. As explained in the proof of
Lemma 1, the Merkle tree construction (i.e., the computation
of ei;ti 1 during downloading) and the server verification of
the Merkle tree root (during uploading) do not provide the
server any additional information to identify a data block.
The user verification and update processes all happen at the
client side. In the uploading process, the target data block
swaps its location with a random dummy block at the top
layer. But, because every uploaded data block is updated, the
server cannot do better in identifying the target data block
than random guessing. Lastly, due to the randomness of group
signature generation (i.e., si;ti), the server cannot identify a
data block by the verification of the group signature. As a
result, the query process does not leak additional information.
As for shuffling, similar to query, the Merkle tree construc-
tion, the server-side verification, and the client-side verification
do not leak additional information. On the other hand, from the
algorithm, it is straightforward to see that sorting is oblivious.
Therefore, the shuffling process also does not leak additional
information.
Theorem 1: The proposed scheme provides the same level
of access pattern privacy as the underlying ORAM.
Proof: Because neither the modified data format nor the
data query/shuffling process downgrades the security of the
scheme in term of access pattern privacy, Theorem 1 is a
straightforward conclusion from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
B. User Accountability
We now show that any un-authorized modification, replace-
ment, or misplacement conducted by a malicious user can be
detected either by the server or by the user who next accesses
the data block.
1) Modification Attacks: Modification attacks are referred
to as the attacks where a malicious user modifies the actual
content of a data block without proper authorization. This can
be detected thanks to the presence of group signature g, which
can be signed only by the users who are authorized to write
the data block. The identity of the user who last accessed the
data block can be identified by opening the group signature s.
2) Replacement Attacks: Instead of modifying the data
content, a malicious user may launch replacement attacks by
replacing some or all fields of a data block Di;ti with those
of another block Dj;tj or an older version of the same block
Di;t0i (t
0
i < ti), and then generating a valid group signature s.
Our scheme deals with this type of attacks via Merkle hash
tree and consistency checking between fields.
Recall that each data block consists of the following fields:
d0, c, e, e0, l, b, and s. Among these fields, the server keeps a
copy of the root hash e and checks whether e in the uploaded
block is the same as the saved value. Hence, e is well-
protected and cannot be replaced. Also, note that d0 and c
contain the same random nonce ri;vi ; hence, if one is replaced
while the other is not, this can be easily detected by checking
the consistency between them. Moreover, attacks against the
position information l and b are referred to as misplacement
attacks and will be discussed later. Therefore, in this section,
we analyze the following replacement attacks: replacement of
d0 and c; or replacement of d0, c, and e0.
a) Replacement of d0 and c: This can be detected by the
user who next accesses the block during the root hash verifi-
cation step (V4). As described in (V4), to verify the root hash
ei;ti 1 carried in Di;ti , which was calculated by the server
when the block was last accessed, the following information
are needed: ci;ti 1 – the ID hash, and Si;ti 1 – the co-path
hashes. ci;ti 1 can be derived as ci;ti 1 = H(i;ti 1; i; ri;vi),
where vi is the version number of the data content when the
block was last accessed, and both i and ri;vi are embedded in
d0i;ti . Clearly, replacement of d
0
i;ti
with d0j;tj of another block
would result in an incorrect ID being used to derive ci;ti 1 and
hence would fail the verification process. Now, let’s consider
the attacks by replacing d0i;ti with an older version of the
same block, i.e., d0i;t0i whose data content has an earlier version
number of v0i < vi. As the nonces embedded in d
0
i;t0i
are ri;v0i
and ri;v0i 1, we have vi > v
0
i > v
0
i   1. This means that the
random nonce ri;vi needed to derive ci;ti 1 cannot be found
in the replaced d0, which also would result in a verification
failure. Here, we assume that the space for the random nonce
is large enough so that the probability of two randomly picked
nonces being the same is negligibly small.
b) Replacement of d0, c, and e0: As described in the
server operation step (O3), the server verifies that the e0 values
are distinct in all the uploaded data blocks during the same
query/shuffling process. Therefore, it may only be possible that
a malicious user attempts to replace d0i;ti , ci;ti , and e
0
i;ti 1 with
those of another block Dj;t0j from a different query/shuffling
process, or an older version of the same block Di;t0i (t
0
i < ti).
In either case, a different Merkle hash tree was constructed.
Therefore, similar to the discussions above, such an attack
can be detected by the user who next accesses the block,
as it would result in a root hash verification failure due to
the replaced co-path hashes. Here, we assume that the hash
function H is well designed so that for two different Merkle
hash trees, the probability that they have the same root hash
is negligibly small.
3) Misplacement Attacks: A malicious user may place a
data block in the wrong bucket and/or layer of the storage
hierarchy. Such attacks can be detected in one of the following
ways: (i) the position of the block is inconsistent with the hash
of its ID using the designated hash function; or (ii) the data
block cannot be found at the specified position. In the latter
case, the server may work with the dataset owner to scan the
storage hierarchy to locate the misplaced block and identify
the attacker through group signature s.
VI. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
A. Storage and Communication Overhead
1) Server Storage Overhead: As our scheme requires ad-
ditional fields in each data block Di;ti , including i;ti , ri;vi ,
ri;vi 1, i, gi;vi , ci;ti , ei;ti 1, e
0
i;ti 1, li;ti , bi;ti and si;ti , extra
storage is needed on the server. We assume that each hash
value (i;ti , ri;vi , ri;vi 1, ci;ti , and ei;ti 1) is 32-byte long
and one group signature (gi;vi and si;ti) takes less than 200
bytes [31]. i is the block ID, which is of log n bits. li;ti and
bi;ti store the layer and bucket indices. Since there are log n
layers in the storage hierarchy and at most n buckets at each
layer, li;ti is of log log n bits and bi;ti is of log n bits. e
0
i;ti 1
introduces a larger overhead, because it stores the information
that corresponds to a path from root to leaf in the Merkle
hash tree. In the worst case, the Merkle hash tree may contain
n log n data blocks (i.e., when the entire database is shuffled)
and thus e0i;ti 1 may store up to log(n log n) hash values.
Fortunately, this is still considered a small amount of storage
overhead in practice. For example, assuming n  232 and each
hash value is of 32 bytes, the size of e0i;ti 1 is 32 log(n log n)
bytes, which is less than 1:1 KB, when n  232. To summarize,
the overall extra overhead per data block is O(log n) bytes.
Table III shows the storage overhead with different numbers
of data blocks. Considering that a data block is typically 64
KB or 256 KB in practice [12], the extra overhead is less than
3% of data block size.
TABLE III. STORAGE OVERHEAD PER DATA BLOCK.
# blocks (n) 220 224 228 232
Extra Overhead 1:32 KB 1:45 KB 1:58 KB 1:71 KB
2) User Storage Overhead: A user also needs an extra
storage space to store (i) the encryption keys for the blocks
that the user is authorized to read, (ii) the group private keys
for the blocks that the user is authorized to write, and (iii) all
the group public keys for verifying each block. As a result, a
user needs O(mR + mW ) storage overhead, where mR and
mW are the number of read groups and number of write
groups respectively. Note that in the worst case, the owner
may classify each data block as a read/write group, which
results in mR = mW = n, where n is the number of blocks
in the system. However, in practice, a shared data set typically
may have a limited number of access policies (e.g., no more
than a few hundred). Thus, the overhead for storing the keys is
acceptable (e.g., no more than a few megabytes). Moreover, as
explained in Section IV-C, the Merkle hash tree is constructed
by the server and the user only needs to verify the Merkle
hash tree information it retrieves; hence, no storage overhead
is introduced for this process.
3) Communication Overhead: As explained in the storage
overhead, the proposed scheme will increase the data block
size slightly. On the other hand, the number of data blocks
transmitted during query and shuffling are asymptotically the
same between the proposed scheme and the original ORAM.
As a result, the proposed scheme adds only small communi-
cation overhead to the original ORAM.
B. Computational Overhead
1) Server Overhead: For each data query, the additional
(amortized) computational overhead at the server side includes
O(log2 n) hash computations (to construct a Merkle hash tree)
and O(log2 n) group signature verifications.
2) User Overhead: For each data block Di;ti retrieved in a
query or shuffling process, a user needs to perform the follow-
ing extra computations: (i) verification of the group signatures
gi;vi in the retrieved data block (and generation of gi;vi+1 for
the updated data block for a write operation); (ii) verification of
ci;ti in the retrieved data block and generation of ci;ti+1 for the
updated data block, both of which are hash computations; (iii)
decryption of e0i;ti 1 and re-encryption of e
0
i;ti
; (iv) verification
of the root hash ei;ti 1 of the Merkle hash tree, which is
composed of a sequence of hash computations; (v) verification
of placement of Di;ti , which is one hash computation; (vi)
verification of group signature si;ti and generation of si;ti+1;
and (vii) verification of ei;ti and Si;ti received from the server,
which is composed of a sequence of hash computations. Using
a modern pairing-based cryptography library such as PBC
library [32], each of the above computations can be done
efficiently from several milliseconds to several hundreds of
milliseconds.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes an accountability solution for hash-
based ORAM schemes such as [18]. It detects misconduct
committed by malicious users and identify the attacker, without
interfering with the access pattern preservation mechanisms
inherent from the underlying ORAM. This is achieved through
an integration of Merkle hash tree and group signature tech-
niques, as well as a delicate design of the data block format.
As a tradeoff, the storage, communication, and computational
overheads are increased slightly. Our proposed accountability
support can also be extended to work with other hash-based
hierarchical ORAM schemes [4]–[6], [9], [10], as long as the
extended data format does not give the server non-negligible
advantages in inferring users’ access pattern in the integrated
schemes. However, its integration with Bloom filter-based or
index-based ORAM schemes [2], [3], [7], [8], [11]–[17] is
nontrivial, and will be studied in our future work.
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APPENDIX 1
In this section, we explain the three building blocks of
our proposed scheme: Oblivious RAM, group signature, and
Merkle hash tree.
Oblivious RAM
Existing ORAM schemes can be roughly classified into
two categories depending on how the user decides the storage
location of a data block: (i) hash-based ORAMs where a data
block’s storage location is decided according to hash functions,
and (ii) index-based ORAMs where a block’s storage location
is retrieved from an index map. Our scheme is designed to
integrate with most hash-based ORAM schemes. In this paper,
we present how our scheme works with the seminal hash-based
ORAM scheme proposed in [18], which provides a framework
for all other hash-based ORAMs. We now briefly explain how
this ORAM scheme works:
Storage: In ORAM, user’s data are stored as a set of
encrypted and equal-sized data blocks, as shown in Fig. 4.
All data blocks are organized in a hierarchical structure which
consists of log n layers (where n is the number of data blocks).
Layer i contains 2i buckets, each of which can store log n data
blocks. Layer i may store up to 2i real data blocks, while the
rest are dummy blocks. Real data blocks are stored into buckets
based on the hash of their IDs.
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Fig. 4. ORAM storage and the query process for data block DT . In
this example, buckets with circles are selected by the user and all blocks
inside those buckets will be downloaded. Solid-line circles denote the buckets
selected via applying hash function on target data ID T , and dashed-line circles
represent the buckets randomly selected.
Query: The data query is executed whenever the user
wants to retrieve a target block from the server. To hide the
actual target block from the server, the ORAM query works
in a manner so that all layers will be accessed, and the
buckets accessed at each layer appear random to the server.
Specifically, to retrieve a target block with ID T at the Cq’th
query, the user performs the following operations.
 Both buckets at the top layer are retrieved from the
server. If the target data block is found in either bucket,
the flag found is set to true; else, it is set to false.
 For each layer i from 2 to log n,
 If found = true, a bucket is selected uni-
formly at random from the layer and all data
blocks in this bucket are retrieved.
 If found = false, all data blocks in bucket
hi(bCq=2ic; T ) are retrieved, where hi() is a
hash function for layer i. If the target block is
found among the retrieved blocks, found is
set to true.
 At the end of the query, the user randomly selects a
dummy data block from the top layer and replaces it
with the target data block. Then, all data blocks of the
top layer are re-encrypted and uploaded back to the
top layer.
3) Shuffling: As target blocks are gradually moved from
bottom layers to upper layers, the shuffling process is triggered
periodically to avoid layer overflow. For layer i, the shuffling
process takes place every 2i accesses. The shuffling process
for layer i essentially re-positions all real data blocks on and
above layer i into layer i+ 1 in an oblivious manner. Due to
space limitation, please refer to [18] for details.
Group Signature and Merkle Hash Tree
Group signatures [23] are often used to allow each member
of a group to anonymously sign a message on behalf of the
group. Typically, there is a group manager who is in charge of
the membership management and has the ability to reveal the
identity of the signer in the event of disputes. For simplicity,
we assume that a group signature scheme provides a primitive
Gi-Sigu(m) which generates the signature for messagem with
the secret key of group member u, where we use subscript i
to differentiate different groups.
A Merkle hash tree [22] is typically used to allow efficient
verification of the integrity of a large set of data. In a Merkle
hash tree, the leaves are hashes of data blocks and each interior
node (including the root) is the hash of its child nodes. The
root of a Merkle hash tree is called the root hash, and the set
of hash values that are needed to calculate the root hash from
a leaf node is called the co-path (denoted as S) from the leaf
node to the root. For example, in Fig. 5, the co-path for data
block D1 from the leaf node h0 1 to the root h2 1 is S1 =
fh0 2; h1 2g.
)|( 211112 −−− = hhHh
)|( 201011 −−− = hhHh )|( 403021 −−− = hhHh
)( 110 DHh =− )( 220 DHh =− )( 330 DHh =− )( 440 DHh =−
Fig. 5. A Merkle hash tree for verifying the integrity of data blocks D1-D4
(H is a hash function).
APPENDIX 2
The shuffling process in the proposed scheme works in the
same fashion as in the original ORAM, which contains several
rounds of tagging and oblivious sorting. However, because we
do not allow a user to add new data blocks to the server, the
original ORAM shuffling process must be modified to suit this
requirement. In addition, the proposed scheme also requires the
server to construct the Merkle hash tree for all the data blocks
to be shuffled at the beginning and verify the Merkle hash tree
information in each data block when they are finally put back
to the server. The user that performs the shuffling also needs to
perform various verifications as described in the query process
when data blocks are downloaded. Incorporating accountability
mechanisms, the detailed operations of the shuffling process
are as follows. An example where l = 2 is shown in Fig. 6.
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(S1) Data blocks from two layers are merged. Each data block’s Merkle hash tree
information is attached.
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(S2) The user verifies and updates each data block and augments each data block
with a tag from [0; 4].
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(S3) Data blocks are obliviously sorted.
Buffer
3,
D1
1,
D2
0,
~
3,
D4
4,
D3
1,
~
2,
~
3,
~
4,
~
log n log nlog nlog n
0,
~
0,
~
(S4) Scan the blocks and leave exactly logn blocks with tag j, for each j from 1 to 2i
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(S5)-(S6) Obliviously sort the buffer, put each data block to its bucket.
Fig. 6. Example of the shuffling process. Each bucket has logn data blocks.
We use symbol “” to represent one or more adjacent dummy data blocks.
(S1) The server merges all the data blocks at layers 1;    ; l
to a shuffling buffer, builds a Merkle hash tree with the
data ID hash fields of these blocks as leaf nodes, and
calculates the root hash. Then, for each block Di;ti in
the buffer, the root hash value ei;ti and its corresponding
co-path values Si;ti are attached to the block. After this,
the following five steps are performed by the user who
conducts the shuffling process.
(S2) In this step, the user scans (i.e., downloads, processes,
and re-uploads back) the blocks in the shuffling buffer,
one by one. More specifically, after a block Di;ti has
been downloaded, the validity of the data block, including
the attached ei;ti and Si;ti , is first checked in a similar
manner as in the verification process during a regular
query (please refer to Section IV-C). If the check fails,
the user stops the shuffling process and informs the
owner of the potential tampering of the data block.
Otherwise, the block is further processed as follows to
obtain a new block of different appearance: (i) A new
initialization vector i;new and a new nonce i;new are
picked uniformly at random. (ii) d0i;ti is re-computed
as Ek(i;new, i;new, ri;vi , ri;vi 1, i, di;vi , gi;vi) and
ci;ti is re-computed as H(i;new; i; ri;vi). (iii) The root
hash value is replaced with ei;ti . (iv) e
0
i;ti
is computed
as Ek(i;ti ;Si;ti). (v) A tag Ti is assigned to indicate
which bucket the block should reside after the shuffling.
Particularly, if the block is a real data block of ID i,
Ti = hl(Cq=2
l; i); otherwise (i.e., the block is a dummy
block), Ti is picked from f0;    ; 2ig such that, after the
assignment has been performed for all the dummy blocks
in the buffer, log n dummy blocks are assigned with tag j
for each j = 1;    ; 2i while the rest dummy blocks are
assigned with tag 0. (vi) Tag Ti is encrypted and saved
in field bi; that is, bi;new = Ek(ri;ti+1; Ti). And li;new are
all set to l. (vii) Group signature si is re-computed for
the entire block.
(S3) In this step, the user conducts an oblivious sorting for
all the blocks in the shuffling buffer, based on the tags
carried by the blocks. As a result, the blocks are placed
in the shuffling buffer according to the ascending order
of their tags, and for blocks of the same tag, the real
data blocks are placed before dummy blocks. Note that
during the sorting process, the overall data block will be
encrypted by the encryption key k to prevent the server
from identifying a data block. For more details about how
oblivious sorting is performed, please refer to [18].
(S4) Again, the user scans the blocks in the shuffling buffer,
one by one. This time, the tags of some dummy blocks
are adjusted to ensure that, for each j = 1;    ; 2l,
exactly logn (real or dummy) data blocks are assigned
with tag j, while other dummy blocks are assigned
with tag 0. Based on the sorting result of (S3), the
tag adjustment can be conducted as follows by using a
temporary counter: For each j = 1;    ; 2l, when the first
block with tag j is scanned, the counter is initialized to
1. Later on, when a block of the same tag is scanned,
the tag of the block remains unchanged and the counter
is incremented by 1, if the counter is smaller than log n;
otherwise (i.e., the counter is equal to logn), the block
should be re-tagged with 0.
(S5) In this step, the user conducts another oblivious sorting
for all the blocks in the shuffling buffer, based on the
tags carried by the blocks. As a result, the blocks are
placed in the shuffling buffer according to the ascending
order of their tags; for blocks of the same tag, however,
the data blocks are placed randomly.
(S6) In this step, a third scan is performed to specify the new
location of each block in the shuffling buffer. Specifically,
according to the order produced by (S5), the blocks are
placed into the buckets from layer 1 to layer l and from
bucket 1 to bucket 2j for each layer j. Also, for each
block i, the li;new and bi;new fields save its assigned layer
number and bucket number; e0 contains an encrypted
version of its Si;ti (without a random nonce) to allow
the server to check whether the block carries a unique e0
value.
Note that, in the last time when all data blocks are uploaded
back to buckets, the server needs to check whether the up-
loaded set is the same as the downloaded set.
APPENDIX 3
Occasionally, the file system may be updated by adding
new data blocks and/or removing existing data blocks. In the
proposed scheme, data addition and deletion is handled by the
data owner and is processed in the same fashion as in the
underlying ORAM scheme.
To delete a data block, the owner first creates a new dummy
data block (as described in Section IV-B) whose ID is set to
be the same as the block to be removed. This new dummy
data block will replace the data block to be removed. To
achieve this, the data owner makes a query (as described
in Section IV-C) with the target set as the data block to be
removed. Then when uploading the data blocks back to the
server, the owner replaces the target data block with the new
dummy data block. Note that due to the Merkle hash tree
verification, the new dummy data block’s ID must be the same
as the ID of the deleted data block, because the root hash is
calculated using the removed data block’s ID information. Also
note that only the data owner can write a dummy data block.
To insert a new data block, the owner first determines if
the new block falls into an existing read (write) group. If it
doesn’t belong to any existing read groups, a new read group
Rx is created and the owner selects an encryption key kRx for
this read group. Similarly, if it doesn’t belong to any existing
write groups, a new write group Wy is created and the owner
selects a group public key K+Wy and a set of group private keys
fK u;Wyg for this write group. Then, the owner (i) publishes
K+Wy , (ii) disseminates kRy to users who can read the new data
block, and (iii) disseminates a unique K u;Wy to each user who
can write the new data block. After that, the owner creates the
new data block as described in Section IV-B. In order to put the
new data block onto the server, the data owner swaps it with
a dummy data block on the server whose ID will be assigned
to the new data block. This swapping process is similar to the
one described in the last paragraph.
Note that in ORAM, under certain conditions, addi-
tion/deletion of a real data block may change the number of
layers in the ORAM storage. In such cases, the owner may
first change the number of layers per the rules defined in the
underlying ORAM scheme and then add/delete the data block
as afore-explained.
